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Introduction 
In a charged environment of political uncertainty, rampant crime and random violence, Iraq’s 
economic problems have often been viewed as secondary. In part this misconception stems from 
the fact that Iraq’s economic situation might appear to have improved substantially since the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and in many ways it has. Karada, Baghdad’s main shopping 
street, boasts a thriving market in expensive consumer items, some of which had been 
unavailable for years. Rising salaries and incomes have enabled many Iraqis to repurchase 
household items sold during the sanctions-era of the 1990s.[1]  
No doubt much of this new found consumer good boom can be attributed to the policies to the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Its September 2003 decision to increase substantially 
public sector wages benefited at least one million employees. Anti-inflationary policies made 
possible by the independence granted Iraq’s Central Bank by the CPA have helped stabilize 
inflation in the 20 to 30 percent range. The new Iraqi currency has been surprisingly stable, in 
large part due to the CPA’s efforts at converting and unifying the currency.  
Still, however welcome, consumption growth and relative price stability are only a first start. Alone, 
they will not assure future prosperity. They do not represent the type of reconstruction required by 
an economy devastated by decades of mismanagement, war, sanctions, and rampant criminal 
activity. As of early 2005, insufficient progress has been made in such critical areas as major 
public construction works; factories by and large, especially the large state-enterprises are 
deserted or operating well below capacity. Consumer spending has done little to reduce 
unemployment, and as much as 60 percent of the population is still dependent on food rations for 
survival.[2] 
When coalition officials arrived in Iraq after the war, they planned on turning Iraq into a free 
market economy—a model for capitalism in the Middle East.[3] As part of this plan, they expected 
private companies, both foreign and domestic, to play a leading role in jump-starting the economy. 
Free market incentives driven by pent-up demand and a massive aid-financed reconstruction 
program were thought to be sufficient to induce a massive wave of investment and hiring of Iraqi 
workers.[4] But violence, crime, and uncertainty over the future have undermined investor 
confidence, preventing market-driven mechanisms from playing their anticipated role. 
Slow job creation in the public sector, stemming in part from the de-Ba’thification program,[5] the 
limited productive capacity of agriculture and the formal private economy to absorb surplus labor 
combined with rapid population growth and deteriorating skills appears to be creating, in addition 
to outright unemployment estimated at anywhere from twenty-five to seventy percent, a vast pool 
of workers toiling at extremely low wages in the country’s expanding informal economy. Many of 
Iraq’s current economic difficulties are fairly typical in strife-torn countries.[6] 
The sections below assess the dynamics of Iraq’s urban informal economy. Emphasis will be on 
the country’s labor market dynamics. What demographic factors are currently at work to expand 
this important component of the economy? What are the main areas and characteristics of Iraq’s 
contemporary informal economy? Based on the answers to these questions a final section 
assesses what might lie in store for Iraq’s urban informal economy.  
Labor Market Dynamics  
Labor markets ultimately depend on a country’s demographic dynamics. Even without the 
destruction brought on by wars, sanctions, and mismanagement, contemporary Iraq would likely 
have a large and growing informal economy. Over the years rapid population growth together with 
slow job creation has had two main consequences, outright unemployment and expanding 
workers drifting into income earning informal activities. However the precise magnitudes of these 
patterns are difficult to estimate. 
First, our picture of Iraq’s demographic structure and change over time is far from perfect.[7] 
There are serious doubts about the population figures produced in Iraq’s last official census 
conducted in 1977. That census suggested a population of 21.7 million. 
Working figures obtained from the now dissolved Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and based 
on those produced by the Ministry of Planning suggest that excluding those resident in the three 
self-ruled Kurdish provinces, the country’s population in 2001 was 21.5 million. Rough estimates 
for these three provinces would indicate that some four million people resided there in 2001. 
Second, the rate of population growth is also unknown. It has likely increased steadily since 1993 
when it was only 1.9 percent, at a time when many middle class Iraqis were leaving the country. 
The International Monetary Fund[8] estimates the current figure of 2.7 percent per annum which, 
given the high rates of population growth common throughout the Middle East, seems reasonable.  
Third, albeit to a lesser extent, the precise extent of urbanization is also unclear. For a developing 
country, Iraq appears very urbanized. The growth of cites has been rapid ever since the adoption 
of state planning policies in the 1960s designed to develop industry and to manage the 
agricultural sector. In fact, the country is likely to have experienced an accelerating trend of 
migration to urban centers from less prosperous rural areas. Rough estimates suggest that 
Baghdad and its surrounding province accounted for more than thirty-one percent of the 
population at the time of the 1997 census. A rough figure of the country’s urbanization is seventy-
five percent of the population now residing in towns. Data form the World Bank[9] suggests the 
country’s urban population grew by approximately five percent a year between 1970 and 2000. 
Fourth, a benchmark period for “normal” economic conditions in Iraq is hard to specify. Prior to 
the invasion of Kuwait which triggered the sanctions, Iraq had been in a war with Iran for the best 
part of the 1980s. Employment patterns were heavily influenced by that war and the subsequent 
period of sanctions in the 1990s. For what it’s worth, the 1987 data suggests the country is 
essentially a service economy with that sector the largest employer by far, accounting for nearly 
half of all workers. Nearly a quarter of all workers were employed by the government, and a large 
proportion of those by the armed forces and the security services. Sectors with significant 
numbers of the self-employed, such as agriculture and wholesale and retail trace accounted for a 
small proportion of the labor force, around twelve and six percent, respectively.[10] 
As noted above, this picture of Iraq’s population is roughly consistent with to the more 
documented trends found elsewhere in the Middle East,[11] with the country’s labor force 
patterns roughly similar to those found in the region’s other oil rentier states.[12] In terms of the 
demographics, the present population of the Middle East and North Africa is relatively young. 
Nearly thirty-six percent of region’s population is less than fifteen years old. An additional 21.5 
percent are between fifteen and twenty-four years. The young age structure of the region’s 
population is the result of major demographic changes that have taken place in the post-World 
War II period. Historically the region maintained higher rates of fertility than most other developing 
regions. Between 1950 and 1970, fertility rates in the region averaged about seven children per 
women. As expected, high fertility rates over time led to rapid rates of population growth and a 
rising share of the youth population. Between 1950 and 1975 the regions population doubled. It 
had more than tripled by 1990. 
Fertility rates in the region began a slow decline in the 1970s, and have undergone significant 
reductions since the late 1980s. Still the persistently high fertility rates have implied that the 
region’s age structure would exhibit an extended and large youth bulge.[13] The youth population 
grew at an average rate of about 3.2 percent a year between 1970 and 2000. Clearly, the relative 
size of the youth bulge is exerting direct pressure on labor markets throughout the region—
especially in Iraq. What makes the youth bulge significant is its timing, interaction with other 
socioeconomic trends and implications for employment creation. 
For most of the Middle Eastern countries, the emergence of the youth bulge in the coincided with 
the collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s and the weak growth performance that characterized 
afterwards.[14] Iraq’s case was even more severe with the sanctions period of the 1990s further 
dampening the country’s job creation potential. The normal pattern of unemployment is one 
whereby the incidence is considerably higher among youth, mostly first time job seekers. For this 
group unemployment rates are commonly twice that of the overall labor force. In Iraq’s case a 
plausible figure for youth unemployment is sixty percent, double the commonly quoted figure of 
thirty percent overall unemployment. There is little doubt that the region’s young first-time job 
seekers bore the brunt of high unemployment and stagnant real wages in the 1990s. This 
continues to be the case today, especially in Iraq. 
The other side of the demographic pressure on labor markets is the pattern of employment in the 
formal sector. With significant pay increases for public workers and little private sector 
employment a dualistic labor market is being created. Higher wages and non-wage benefits, 
together with job security in the public sector, has resulted in a disproportionate number of Iraqis 
seek work in this sector as opposed to the private sector. 
At the same time, the attractiveness of public sector employment, especially for those with a 
secondary education, raises many workers reservation wage for the private sector. The 
subsequent inability to attract qualified workers needed to direct and supervise those with limited 
education and skills further stifles private sector expansion. This process, also dominant in Iraq 
starting with the Ba’thist rise to power in the 1960s, and continuing up to around 1988,[15] was 
previously able to avoid high levels of unemployment and growing informal economy through the 
rapid expansion of the public sector. Starting with greatly constrained finances in the sanctions 
period, slow public sector employment growth has simply left the unemployed or forced to drift 
into the informal sector. The result is a two-tier system that overprotects formal-sector public 
employees and under-protects workers in the informal sector. While an extreme case in Iraq, this 
pattern of labor market distortion is found throughout the Middle East.[16] 
In sum, even without the wars and sanctions, it is highly likely that Iraq would have a sizable 
informal economy at this point in time. Those events, together with the instability and insurgency 
following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein have only reinforced long standing trends in the 
country’s labor markets.  
Human Capital in Iraq  
The gaps, noted above, in skills needed for dynamic private sector growth are deep seeded. 
Many deficiencies can be traced back to the socialist development plans adopted in the 1960s. 
On the demand side, Iraq adopted a full employment policy in 1968 committing the public sector 
to provide jobs for each and every individual regardless of market forces. The result was over 
employment in the public sector. At the same time the private sector was denied a normal flow of 
technically skilled secondary graduates and young university graduates. This policy created sharp 
manpower imbalances leading to inflationary pressures and lower overall national productivity.[17] 
Yet the program was sustainable with oil revenues camouflaging the economy’s underlying 
structural weaknesses. 
In addition, and especially prior to 1970, economic development plans in Iraq were founded on 
the idea of investing in physical plant and infrastructure and did not give development of human 
capital a high priority. Labor force needs were not spelled out, nor were they based on any 
realistic estimates of the skill requirements implicitly required by the planned capital investments. 
The result was a shortage of skilled workers in certain technical fields and an excess in others.[18]  
The 1971-75 and 1976-80 National Development Plans attempted to overcome these deficiencies. 
The 1971-75 Plan stressed that "labor force planning must go side by side with economic 
development planning." Planners began to recognize that no effective manpower and 
employment planning could be performed independently of overall national planning. 
A somewhat different picture emerges, however, from scrutiny of Iraq 's actual expenditures on 
education and health. This situation is especially so upon examination of the country's pattern of 
defense expenditures and in comparison with Iran and with other Arab countries, particularly 
during the 1980s:[19] 
· Government expenditures for education on a per capita basis expanded by 17.28 percent 
between 1974 and 1979, roughly the same rate achieved by Iran. While this figure was 
quite high, it was still considerably below the rates achieved by other Arab countries 
during this period.  
· Health expenditures expanded more rapidly than in most developing countries, 
increasing at 23.63 percent during the late 1970s.  
· However, during the early 1980s, there was a major contraction in educational 
expenditures, averaging a decline of 5.74 percent per annum on a per capita basis during 
1979-84. Comparable figures for Iran showed an increase of 3.69 percent.  
· The share of educational expenditures in gross national product (GNP) in Iraq increased 
slightly from 3.12 percent in 1974 to 3.19 percent in 1979 and (largely as a result of 
declining GNP) to 3.40 percent in 1984. Comparable figures for the Arab countries as a 
whole were 3.86, 5.00, and 5.34 percent, respectively.  
· Iran's performance during this period was even better; its commitment to educational 
expenditures increased from 3.10 percent in 1974 to 7.51 percent in 1984.  
· As might be expected, a major cause of the decline in educational expenditure during this 
period was Iraq's massive increase in military expenditures. These expenditures 
increased by 34.25 percent per annum on a per capita basis during 1979-84, compared 
with an increase of 14.6 percent by Iran and -0.04 percent for the Arab countries as a 
whole.  
· Iraq's health expenditure also suffered during the early war years, decreasing at an 
average annual rate of 6.93 percent per capita. In relation to Iran, Iraq 's Health 
expenditures have been considerably below Arab standards, increasing from $7.28 per 
capita in 1974 to $21.69 in 1979 only to decline to $14.69 in 1984. Comparable figures 
for the Arab countries as a whole were $33.57, $68.58, and $97.48.  
The situation only deteriorated further during the period of sanctions in the 1990s. In addition to 
further cutbacks in the funding of public education, gender gaps began to grow because of 
families’ economic need; when given a choice to send a male child or female child to school, 
most chose to keep the girl home. UNESCO estimates that in 1987 about 75 percent of Iraqi 
women were literate, but by the end of 2000 that number had shrunk to 254 percent and that Iraq 
had the lowest adult literacy levels in all of the Middle East.[20] 
In short, Iraq fell considerably behind neighboring Arab countries in its commitment to human 
capital formation. A recent survey[21] by Zogby International is suggestive of some of the areas 
of training and skill formation that the government will have to give top priority. The interviews 
conducted over the period October 17 to December 3, 2004) of 454 Iraqi owners or managers of 
small-to-medium sized registered businesses (less than one hundred employees) in Baghdad 
(264 interviews), Ibril (90 interviews), and Hilla (100 interviews) found that:[22] 
· The top needs in Iraq’s workforce are for more English language training and computer 
training;  
· English training was the top concern in both Hilla and Irbil, where two-in-five business 
operators (38 percent) say it is the area that needs to be addressed the most in the Iraqi 
workforce;  
· In both cities computer training ranks second with three in ten (30 percent in Hilla and 32 
percent in Irbil) citing this as the top need of the Iraqi workforce;  
· In Baghdad however, this percentage drops to 17 percent—placing it fourth behind a 
better work ethic (25 percent), computer training (22 percent) and a better education 
system (19 percent); and  
· Among Shiites, computer training places first (31 percent); among Sunnis, English 
training is the top concern (33 percent). Kurds are more likely than other ethnic groups to 
call for greater English Language training (34 percent) while Arabs split between more 
English training and more computer training (24 percent and 25 percent, respectively.)  
At the same time expansion of private sector activity is constrained by shortages of appropriately 
trained workers, the educational system has declined through years of neglect and destruction 
and will take years to renovate and restore. According to UNICEFF of 15,000 academic buildings 
in Iraq eighty percent are damaged and in need of repair, forty percent require major 
reconstruction work and nine percent require complete demolition and rebuilding.[23] The Iraqi 
Ministry of Education has set a deadline of four years for the completing the rebuilding of the 
system task. According to USAID, which has provided the bulk of the funding for the effort, in the 
region of 2,400 schools have already been renovated. 
But reconstruction alone is not enough: Iraq’s growing population means more young minds to 
school than ever before. In 2000 there were 3.6 million Iraqis of primary school age. Today there 
are 4.3 million. The government is struggling to keep up. Overcrowded classes are the norm, and 
many schools have been forced to run two or three shifts a day, at the toll of less classroom time 
for the students. UNICEF estimates that a further 4,500 new schools are needed if the class sizes 
are to be brought down to an acceptable level. 
The picture is a bit brighter for students at the university level. For years universities had been 
unable to keep their libraries up to date with the latest publications and journals, and many were 
looted in the security vacuum immediately following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Since the 
fall of Saddam Hussein, however, tons of books, periodicals, and lab equipment have been 
donated to Iraqi universities. USAID has also awarded five grants, worth $20.7 million to forge 
partnerships between Iraqi and U.S. universities. So far the results have been positive: eighty-
three percent of Iraq’s university students returned to campuses in 2003. 
The fact remains, however, that spiraling costs for security, construction materials, and labor are 
restricting the amount that the government can realistically achieve in the reconstruction of the 
education system in the short term: for the time being the main objective will be to ensure that 
Iraq’s present instability interferes as little as possible with the education of the country’s children.  
Implications for the Urban Informal Economy  
Until significant progress is made restoring security as well as in upgrading the skills of the 
workforce it will be difficult for the private sector to begin absorbing laborers fro the informal 
economy. In the meantime the informal economy is the main engine of job creation in Iraq. The 
supply and demand forces in the labor market noted above have a number of consequences for 
the informal economy. The obvious one of course is that the main areas of labor absorption will 
likely entail workers drifting into the various service sectors such as trade and merchandising as 
well as light, labor intensive manufacturing for local needs and consumption. 
The labor markets also have implications for the types of workers entering the informal economy. 
Petty trading and unskilled casual labor are “bottom line” activities which have virtually free entry. 
There appeared to have been a dramatic rise in the number of people, including young children 
who were involved in these activities to help support their families. Many take on back-breaking 
jobs, earning little money, often only several dollars a day. 
In its boom period of the 1970s and early 1980s, Iraq boasted a large middle class. Inflation 
brought on by economic mismanagement impoverished much of this group. Successive wars 
have killed many breadwinners, leaving widowed mothers and orphaned children. Iraq’s child 
labor woes therefore predate the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, just before the war, the 
White House cited “instances of forced labor” among children and “military training camps for 
children” among its top ten reasons for deposing Hussein. But since then life has become even 
more grueling and dangerous for many of Iraq’s youngsters.[24] 
· A study by a Norwegian Institute, the Fafo Institute of Applied International Studies found 
the percentage of Iraqi children ages six months to five years suffering from malnutrition 
has nearly doubled to 7.7 percent from four percent in March 2003.[25]  
· Iraqi schools have the potential for six million students. In a country where two-thirds of 
the population is under twenty-five the question on parents’ minds is whether the 
government can keep children safe. Citing heightened security concerns the interim 
government delayed the traditional early September opening of schools.[26] Schools 
finally opened October 2nd after a two week delay.[27]  
· Security fears plague many parents of small children in Baghdad, where kidnapping is on 
the rise. Almost half the girls were not going to school at the end of the term in June 
2003.[28]  
In theory, Iraq has some of the most progressive child labor laws in the region. Iraqi law bars 
children under fifteen from working and demands strict worker safety conditions for those fifteen 
and over. By law, working children must receive the same rights and benefits as adults as well as 
regular health checkups. They must receive at least a third of an adult salary and cannot work 
more than several hours a day. 
In practice, however, officials admit that few employers, parents or children abide by such 
regulations. As a result, statistics about child labor in Iraq are sketchy and the insurgency has 
prevented any official survey of the condition of children’s lives.[29] Again, international 
comparisons and antidotal accounts provide some clues of the plight of children in contemporary 
Iraq. Fifteen percent of children ages five to fourteen work in the Middle East and North Africa 
according to UNICEF. In 2000 the International Labor Organization estimated that there were 
66,000 “economically active” Iraqi children between ages ten and fourteen out of a total 
population of twenty-five million.[30] Hundreds of thousands of children in Iraq are prone to injury, 
abuse, and exploitation, according the United Nations Fund for Children (UNICEFF). Children 
below fifteen years of age are nearly twelve million, or forty-four percent of the country’s twenty-
seven million.[31] 
In another study, The Children’s Parliament on the Rights to Education found in 2000 that one out 
of four Iraqi children between six and twelve were not enrolled in school, nearly four times the 
average in the Arab world. But few statistics are available on the extent and range of child labor in 
contemporary Iraq. By all accounts in poverty-stricken neighborhoods of Baghdad such as Sadr 
City, the vast majority of children have jobs, often doing back breaking manual labor for a few 
dollars a day.[32] 
UNICEF sees street children as a growing problem. “Prior to the 1991 Gulf War, the problem 
simply did not exist. There was a very high rate of children in the schools and no child labor. The 
international economic blockage enforced that year to put pressure on Saddam Hussein took 
children out from school into the labor Market.”[33] “Poverty is pushing children into the streets. 
They just need to make their living and bring home some dinars at the end of the day.”[34] 
In major cities through the south like Basra and Karbala, seventy to eighty percent of children 
interviewed by UNICEF after the war were working, and in Najaf, fifty percent of children were not 
in school. USAID has started a pilot program in six cities to draw children back to school, but it 
serves only 650 children among the millions who have dropped out. Sad accounts of child labor 
abound.[35] 
Accounts of income earned by children vary. Representative figures are:[36]  
· Car mechanic—working 7.5 hour shifts, six days per week, for around $10 per day in 
wage plus tips;  
· Water—working from 8:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., for around $23 per week; and  
· Car washer—working six to nine hours per day, for around $3 to $4 per day.  
Many children also drift into areas such as casual labor and petty trading where the range of 
incomes is considerably greater. 
In fact there has been a dramatic rise in all groups of low income earners engaging in “bottom 
line” economic activities such as street vending. There is free entry into these activities so long as 
a person is reasonably healthy. To many, street vending is part of a coping strategy to 
supplement income earned in one or two other jobs. Most however have no other jobs and can 
only support their families by selling goods on the street.[37]  
Informal Activities  
Within the informal economy encompasses a diverse set of activities. A useful classification 
combines their economic sophistication with the needs they meet [Table 1]. Clearly, for many 
Iraqis survival is the main motivation for entering the informal economy. This is certainly one of 
the main reasons for the expansion of this sector. Clearly a certain number of informal activities 
provide a specific and immediate answer to poverty by allowing the most underprivileged sections 
of the population to enter the labor market, albeit in a precarious way. In addition, the informal 
sector opens the way to consumerism, not only for the poorest but also for the masses and the 
middle class. For the last two groups, resorting to the informal sector is a means of saving that 
allows them to buy higher quality imported goods.  
Table 1: Iraq - Summary of Activities of the Informal Economy  
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Survival Response to Poverty:              
   Flea markets, street sellers of diverse, small quantity goods.  
      Foods              
      Used clothes           
      Cigarettes              
      Candies              
      Bread              
                     
                     
Response to Traditions and Food Needs:          
   Small scale food production, bakeries, pastries     
   Seamstresses  Hairdressers           
   Small scale metal work           
   Textiles and leather              
   Potters                 
                     
                     
Response to Modern Aspirations:             
   Modern sector services           
   Small-scale manufacturer           
   Repair and recovery services           
      Furniture              
      Carpentry              
      Car repair              
      Plummers              
   Electrical supplies              
   Transport                 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
It is not clear if the children who work as petty traders take up these activities outside of school 
hours, or whether they have dropped out of school altogether. In economic terms, these activities, 
such as selling from a carton of cigarettes, are extremely low value added and are mainly of a 
marginally redistributive nature. The fact that a large number of people both adults and children, 
are prepared to spend large amount their time trying to earn a narrow margin on a transaction of 
small turnover, indicates that this is not a positive economic opportunity, but a measure of some 
desperation. 
Another manifestation of the informal economy is the development of special markets for the 
exchange of used goods that began cropping up in many towns across the country during the 
period of sanctions. These markets are usually held on specific days of the week. They often 
attract very large numbers of buyers and sellers. The items traded at these markets range from 
bulky household durable goods such as stoves and refrigerators, down to used items of clothing, 
electronic appliances and books. As in the case of petty vending many transactions in these 
markets involve extremely low turnovers. Here too, the willingness of people to spend the entire 
day hoping to make a narrow margin on these transactions reveals the absence of alternative 
opportunities for remunerative employment. 
Street vending, therefore, can be anything from a survival strategy—a desperate search for a 
subsidence income—through petty capitalism, or the diversification of larger merchants to boost 
demand and achieve a higher turnover. Most street operations are much smaller in scale than 
fixed stores or supermarkets in off-street locations, but a few are quite substantial, ranging from 
truck borne mobile stores to big fixed stalls in strategic high demand locations. The income 
distribution of street vendors is highly skewed with a very few making quite high incomes, 
comparable to those of successful storekeepers and career professionals, an most making 
relatively low incomes comparable to those of unskilled manual workers. 
Just as street vending activities vary greatly in scale, timing, location, and remuneration, similar 
differences exist in terms of workforce and types of goods and services. The significance of 
women, men, girls, and boys as street vendors varies considerably from city to city. Goods may 
be narrowly focused on a few lines, for examples, newspapers, and candy or spread across the 
whole gamut from cooked foods, groceries, and hardware through clothing and electrical 
appliances. Shoe shining, hair cutting, document typing, and the repair of shoes, clothes, bicycles 
motorcycles and cars are all common street services. As noted in Table 1 above, these activities 
can be organized into different groups depending on the circumstances of the seller and 
sophistication of product. 
The Iraqi government does not appear to have formed a comprehensive policy toward street 
vendors. Vendors disappear when they think thy may be subject to prescription and they 
reappear when the inspectors and police move on. When asked to move away from a congested 
spot, they often obey and then shift back again in sort time. When persistently harassed in one 
location, they often move on to another location. The key to any future policy towards the sector 
will be one of tapping the entrepreneurial spirit of vendors and channeling it towards higher value 
added activities.  
Assessment  
There are three main schools of thought regarding the relationship between the formal and 
informal economies: 
· The dualists: the informal economy is a separate marginal economy not directly linked to 
the formal economy, providing income or a safety net for the poor.[38]  
· The structuralists: the informal economy is subordinated to the formal economy. In order 
to reduce costs, privileged capitals seek to subordinate petty producers and traders.[39]  
· The legalists: informal work arrangements are a rational response by micro-
entrepreneurs to over-regulation by government bureaucracies.[40]  
Of these interpretations, the Iraqi informal economy appears closest to the dualist interpretation. 
Iraq’s contemporary informal economy is largely a function of fundamental supply and demand 
factors summarized in Figure 1: (a) a youth population bulge, (b) a long-standing state 
employment program providing incentives for employment in the public, but not private sector, (c) 
a workforce of diminished skills following a long period of sanctions, (d) little private sector growth 
stemming from the instability following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and (e) the openness to 
trade (neo-liberal reforms) made many potentially profitable firms unprofitable. In turn, the lack of 
a sizable private sector reduces the links often found between the informal and formal economies 
in many developing countries. 
Figure 1: Dynamics of Iraq’s Labor Markets and Informal Economy 
 
Because the informal economy is largely the result of a convergence of powerful long-run 
demographic and economic forces, it will be a fixture for come time to come. At best it may evolve 
over the next several years with some progression if the government gains greater control over 
the security situation, and private sector investment begins to pick up. Clearly, success in this 
regard will be critical in establishing stability in Iraq. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
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